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system. The new “macroprudential” approach to financial regulations focuses on risks arising in financial 
markets broadly, as well as the potential impact on the financial system that may arise from financial 
distress at systemically important financial institutions. Systemic risk is the key factor in financial 
stability, but our current understanding of systemic risk is rather limited. While the goal of using 
regulation to maintain financial stability is clear, it is not obvious how to design an effective regulatory 
framework that achieves the financial stability objective while also promoting financial innovations. This 
paper discusses academic research and expert opinions on this vital subject of financial stability and 
regulatory reforms. Specifically, among other issues, it discusses the impact of increasing public 
disclosure of supervisory information, the effectiveness of bank stress testing as a tool to enhance 
financial stability, whether the financial crisis was caused by too big to fail (TBTF), and whether the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) resolution regime would be 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Wharton Financial Institutions Center, 
and the Journal of Financial Services Research jointly held a conference on enhancing prudential 
standards in financial regulations on April 8–9, 2014. Despite the extensive regulation and 
supervision of U.S. banking organizations, the U.S. and the world financial systems were shaken 
by the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression, largely precipitated by events within 
the U.S. financial system. The Great Recession that followed the financial crisis has generated 
substantial changes in financial regulation within the U.S. as well as internationally.   
Prevention of systemic risk and the maintenance of financial stability are the central 
goals of recent reforms of financial regulation, including the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) enacted in the U.S. in July 2010. This shifted the emphasis 
of financial regulation away from the monitoring of risk taking at an individual institution to a 
“macroprudential” approach. The new approach focuses on risks arising in financial markets 
broadly as well as the potential impact on the financial system that may arise from financial 
distress at one or more systemically important financial institutions.   
Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo clearly articulated this new approach in a 2014 
speech: 
Beyond the basic reaction that prudential regulation needed to be stronger and less 
subject to arbitrage, considerable support grew for the formerly minority view that 
regulation also needed to be firmly grounded in a macroprudential perspective explicitly 
directed at the stability of the financial system as a whole, not just at each regulated 
firm individually.1    
 
While the goal of using regulation to maintain financial stability is clear, it is less obvious 
how to design a regulatory framework that achieves this objective while also promoting an 
efficient and innovative financial sector. The objective of the conference was to engender a 
robust exchange and discussion of leading scholars, regulators, and market participants on this 
vital subject of financial stability and regulatory reforms.  
1 Governor Daniel Tarullo (February 25, 2014) also pointed out that the recent financial crisis had prompted 
increased attention on the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. Similarly, then-Governor 
Jeremy C. Stein (March 21, 2014) supported the idea of explicitly incorporating financial stability considerations 
into a monetary policy framework. Moreover, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen (July 2, 2014) noted that, in many 
ways, the pursuit of financial stability is complementary to the goals of price stability and full employment.  
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  The DFA has been a landmark piece of legislation — the most sweeping reform of U.S. 
financial regulations since the Great Depression. While the DFA is a specific U.S. regulation, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has also enacted reforms intended to refocus financial 
regulation on containing systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. The DFA made 
promotion of financial stability an explicit goal for the Federal Reserve and created the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council as an interagency body responsible for oversight of U.S. financial 
stability. The DFA also expanded the scope of bank-like regulation to systemically important 
nonbank financial institutions and markets. The new regulatory regime includes enhanced 
prudential standards for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that include 
requirements for stress testing, expanded regulatory reporting, and increased public disclosure 
of supervisory assessments of SIFIs. The new regulations also aimed to end the too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) policy by giving regulators new authorities to resolve failing SIFIs.   
The following are fundamental questions/concerns in the process of regulation reform: 
• Can we anticipate systemic risk events and can regulatory reform effectively combat 
systemic risk? How can we determine whether a financial institution or a group of 
financial institutions are systemically important? Will the current changes in financial 
regulation be effective in enhancing financial stability? Are they sufficient or should 
monetary and fiscal policy tools be used as well?   
• Is increasing the scope, intensity, and complexity of financial regulation the right 
approach or should we simplify regulation, increase transparency, and place greater 
reliance on market discipline? 
• The new financial regulatory regime includes greater public disclosure by SIFIs as 
well as greater disclosure of supervisory assessments. For example, there is 
substantial disclosure of the results from supervisory stress tests. Does increased 
public disclosure of supervisory information enhance financial stability or generate 
greater instability? 
• Stress testing has become a central component of the supervision of SIFIs. Are stress 
tests an effective method for enhancing financial stability? Would a stress-testing 
regime have prevented the mortgage and financial crises? 
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• Concern about financial instability resulting from the failure of a SIFI led to the 
bailout policies known as TBTF. Many economists claim that TBTF policies created 
moral hazard problems — incentives for excessive risk taking — that were the causal 
factor for the financial crisis. Was TBTF, in fact, a causal factor of the crisis? Are the 
new resolution authorities contained in DFA sufficient to end TBTF and contain the 
systemic impact of the failure of one or more SIFIs?   
• The fall in housing prices and the associated large scale defaults in mortgages were 
the proximate cause of the financial crisis. Housing and housing finance play a 
central role in the economy, and many financial crises have been associated with 
downturns in housing. What reforms in housing and housing finance are necessary 
to promote economic growth and financial stability? What should be the future of 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae? 
The remainder of this paper reviews how the research and presentations at the 
conference addressed these questions.   
 
II. Understanding Systemic Risk and the Role of Policy in Enhancing Financial Stability2 
Systemic risk is the key factor in financial stability. However, our current understanding 
of systemic risk is rather limited. While recent discussions of systemic risk have emphasized the 
role of instability generated by financial distress at large interconnected financial institutions, 
systemic risk has arisen in many other ways and even when there are no systemically important 
financial institutions.3 Enhancing regulation of SIFIs may not be sufficient to contain systemic 
risk. A better understanding of the sources of systemic risk as well as the types of systemic risk 
is necessary to design effective financial stability policies. 
2 The session on systemic risks and the DFA resolution plan was moderated by Julapa Jagtiani, who is special 
advisor in bank supervision and regulation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
3 There were no TBTF banks in the 1920s and 1930s, and yet, systemic risk prevailed, resulting in the Great 
Depression. There are also many kinds of systemic risks, such as those caused by panics, falling asset prices (such 
as the bursting of real estate bubbles or other asset price bubbles), contagion, or rising interest rates.   
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At the conference, Franklin Allen4 stated that while systemic risk is often thought to be a 
result of exogenous shocks (e.g., war, natural disaster), systemic risk is often caused by 
endogenous economic factors, with central bank and government policies often inadvertently 
playing a role.   
Our limited understanding of systemic risk makes identifying incipient financial crises 
difficult. For example, many economists point to the rapid rise of housing prices internationally 
as an obvious sign of a financial bubble that was bound to crash and cause systemic instability. 
We certainly see this in the extreme booms and busts in housing prices in Ireland, Spain, 
Greece, and to a lesser extent in the U.S. (see Figure 1). However, Figure 1 also shows that 
countries such as the U.K. and Sweden saw similar increases in house prices with no major 
downturn. We are still uncertain if a collapse in housing prices may occur in these countries in 
the near future. Our ability to identify incipient crashes in financial markets remains quite 
limited.   
Allen also pointed out that the causes of systemic risk have been varied. While financial 
distress at systemically important institutions is sometimes the cause of systemic risk, there are 
many other causes. Banking panics have occurred where there are no SIFIs. Economic research 
points to the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets that can generate bank panics 
and runs. Systemic risk can also arise as a result of collapsing asset prices with economies that 
are particularly vulnerable to large falls in housing prices.5 Foreign exchange mismatches have 
generated international banking crises, such as in the 1997 Asian crisis.   
Weaknesses in the structure of the financial architecture can amplify shocks as in the 
recent crisis. Government policies can be another causal factor. For example, policies that keep 
interest rates too low for too long can promote high leverage and financial fragility in the 
financial sector. Given the varying types and causes of systemic risk, Allen suggested that 
effective financial stability policies would require the coordinated use of multiple policy tools 
including regulation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. 
4 Franklin Allen is the Nippon Life professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and 
codirector of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. He is also the executive director of the Brevan Howard 
Centre and Professor of Finance and Economics at Imperial College London.  
5 See, for example, Herring and Wachter (1999). 
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Figure 1: Nominal Housing Prices in the U.S. and Various European Countries 
 
 
How should a financial system be structured to mitigate systemic risk and maintain 
financial stability? One question that arises concerns the role of financial networks in mitigating 
or propagating financial instability. On the one hand, more interconnected financial networks 
could mean more stability because the losses can be transferred and divided among the banks. 
In this case, the interconnection serves as a cushion to absorb any negative idiosyncratic 
shocks.6 On the other hand, a more interconnected structure could mean more stability 
because the losses can be transferred and divided among the banks. In this case, the 
interconnection serves as a cushion to absorb any negative idiosyncratic shocks.    
Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi7 presented his research titled “Systemic Risk and Stability in 
Financial Networks,” which studies a three-period model using a network framework (more 
commonly used in electrical engineering) to analyze the resiliency of different financial network 
structures to shocks. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2013) find that the optimal 
financial network structure depends on the severity of the shock. For small shocks, a more 
interconnected structure implies greater stability because losses of a distressed bank are 
passed to a larger number of counterparties, guaranteeing a more efficient use of the excess 
liquidity in the system. This result is consistent with Allen and Gale (2000). However, for larger 
6 See Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000). 
7 Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi is an assistant professor (in Decision, Risk and Operations) at Columbia Business School. 
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shocks above a specified threshold, a more interconnected structure is more fragile and prone 
to systemic failures. These findings reinforce Haldane (2009):   
Interconnected networks exhibit a knife-edge, or tipping point, property. Within a 
certain range, connections serve as a shock-absorber. The system acts as a mutual 
insurance device with disturbances dispersed and dissipated [. . . ] But beyond a certain 
range, the system can flip the wrong side of the knife-edge. Interconnections serve as 
shock-amplifiers, not dampeners, as losses cascade. The system acts not as a mutual 
insurance device but as a mutual incendiary device. 
 
In response to the crisis, governments around the globe are acting to reduce systemic 
risks posed by financial distress at SIFIs. Regulatory reform in the U.S. and internationally is 
creating enhanced prudential requirements on those institutions deemed to be SIFIs.  This 
necessitates accurate measures of systemic risk and accurate identification of those financial 
institutions, banks, and nonbanks that have a systemic impact. 8   
Paul Kupiec9 presented Guntay and Kupiec (2014), which explores weaknesses in 
current methods for measuring the systemic risk impact of individual firms and the implications 
of these measures for identifying SIFIs. The paper cites two central flaws in the current 
approaches.10 First, the systemic risk measures are nonparametric estimators with no ability to 
perform formal statistical hypothesis testing. Second, the measures confound systematic risk 
with systemic risk. The authors find that much of the current cross-sectional variation in these 
measures is due to systematic risk (market beta) rather than systemic risk. Guntay and Kupiec 
consider a parametric approach that allows for estimation of systematic and idiosyncratic risk. 
Combining this approach with the existing systemic risk measures allows the authors to 
separate out the systemic risk component and to perform formal statistical hypothesis testing. 
  
 
8 A list of SIFIs has been created by the Basel Committee and is updated in November each year based on the 
institution’s size, complexity, and interconnectedness. Under the DFA, SIFIs are subject to enhanced capital 
standards, such as countercyclical capital buffers, liquidity requirements, increased capital charges for exposures 
to large financial institutions, large exposure rules, etc.    
9 Paul H. Kupiec is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). He is also a member of the Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee. Previously, Kupiec was director of the Center for Financial Research at the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
10 See also Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012). 
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III. Financial Regulatory Architecture: Is Expanding Scope and Complexity the Right 
Approach?  
 
Regulatory reform in response to the financial crisis has generated stronger capital and 
liquidity standards as well as other tougher regulatory standards for banking organizations.  
Regulatory reform has also significantly expanded the scope of bank-like regulation to 
encompass more firms and more activities, and regulations have become increasing complex.   
Why did regulatory reform result in an expanded scope of regulation? The growth of 
shadow banking and the activity of shadow banks are considered key factors in propagating the 
crisis.11 In response to tougher regulation, some financial firms move activities to the 
unregulated sector. Moreover, the inability of regulators to connect the dots has been in part 
blamed on lack of understanding of the interrelationships between the regulated and 
unregulated sector. Regulatory reform aimed to address this problem by casting the net wider, 
encompassing more financial firms and markets as well as creating stronger coordination 
among financial regulators on financial stability issues through the creation of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council. 
The expanded scope of regulation was accompanied by greater complexity of 
regulation. In part, greater complexity is a natural outgrowth of expanding the types of firms 
and activities covered by regulation as well as the increased complexity of financial markets. 
Regulatory arbitrage was also an important factor in the financial crisis. Regulatory arbitrage 
occurs when financial organizations change the form of a particular activity to avoid regulations 
without fundamentally changing the risks of the activity. Many developments in securitization 
markets were driven in large part by attempts to avoid capital regulations. Activities were 
structured to receive off-balance-sheet accounting treatment even where there was no 
shedding of risks. The drive to reduce the ability of financial firms to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage is another factor in the increased complexity of regulations. 
However, some have argued that the increased complexity of regulation is excessively 
distortionary and will prove to be ineffective. Charles Plosser12 discussed these issues in his 
11 See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2013) for a comprehensive discussion and review of this topic. 
12 Charles Plosser has been president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia since 
August 2006.   
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speech during the conference. He pointed to the significant increase in costs related to 
regulatory compliance as a result of the DFA, Basel II, and Basel III and questioned whether 
these regulations will prove to be effective over the longer run.   
Plosser argued that financial markets are constantly innovating, and there are limits to 
the ability of regulations to keep up with these innovations. The attempt to do so creates a 
vicious circle in which financial innovations occur in response to regulations, regulators then 
respond with more complex rules, and this in turn leads to new financial innovations. The end 
result is high costs associated with regulatory compliance and regulatory arbitrage with 
ineffective regulations that cannot feasibly keep up with market innovations.    
Plosser (2014) proposes an alternative approach of simpler and more transparent 
financial regulations, which are easier to understand, easier to implement, and could be 
consistently enforced. He advocated that “simpler and more transparent regulatory approaches 
often work better.”13 Simplicity allows market participants to understand how regulators are 
likely to behave and thereby reduces uncertainty. It also allows regulators to credibly commit to 
implementing the regulations in a consistent manner, thereby increasing their effectiveness 
and fostering financial stability.   
Plosser’s emphasis on simplicity and transparency is related to his views that financial 
stability cannot rely solely on the ability of regulators to understand and combat risks but that 
market forces play a critical role. An effective regulatory regime will provide appropriate 
incentives for market discipline and will leverage information generated by the market. Private 
markets have the resources and, if too-big-to-fail policies are ended, the incentives to 
accurately price risk taking by financial firms. More accurate pricing of risk enhances financial 
stability by reducing moral hazard incentives. In addition, more accurate pricing would enhance 
the value of market signals to regulators. Simple and transparent regulations would further 
improve the quality of market signals by reducing the noise associated with uncertainty. 
Plosser noted that a credible resolution regime was an essential component of an 
effective financial regulatory system. He has concerns about whether the resolution regime 
under the DFA would be credible and effective. The expansive discretionary power given to the 
13 The full speech is available online at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2014/04-
08-14-frbp.cfm. Plosser’s speech is consistent with the views expressed by Haldane (2012). 
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FDIC under Title II of the DFA undermines the credibility of the resolution regime, as it is 
vulnerable to the inevitable political pressures to bail out uninsured creditors of failing 
institutions. Plosser advocates developing a new bankruptcy mechanism suitable for all 
financial firms, whether systemically important or not, to alleviate most of the potential 
problems caused by the discretionary and targeted nature of Title II.   
Plosser also supported incorporating contingent debt that would convert to capital in 
response to specific market indicators of financial distress.14 Such automatic recapitalization 
would help prevent firms from failing in the first place and reduce the impact of any failures 
that did occur. In addition, managers would have a strong incentive to avoid taking on risks that 
might lead to such events, as they would dramatically dilute existing shareholders.   
 
IV. Does Increased Public Disclosure of Supervisory Information Enhance Financial 
Stability?   
 
Plosser advocates increasing the transparency of supervisory information. The view that 
more transparency and public disclosure is beneficial, including disclosure of supervisory 
findings, is common among economists. However, regulators have often resisted public 
disclosure, citing potential harmful effects. One major concern is that the disclosure of 
problems at some financial institutions might result in an over-reaction by the market and 
precipitate runs of uninsured creditors that propagate financial instability.   
Does the disclosure of supervisory information enhance financial stability or undermine 
financial stability? Many economists and policymakers point to the disclosure of the first 
supervisory stress test in the U.S., the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), as 
evidence of the benefits of public disclosure. The disclosure of SCAP results revealed significant 
details about the activities of large banking organizations as well as supervisory assessments of 
the capital adequacy of those firms. While there was considerable concern and debate among 
policymakers over the release of the SCAP results, SCAP disclosures are generally credited with 
reducing uncertainty and increasing market confidence in the U.S. financial sector.15 As a result, 
14 See Calomiris and Herring (2013) for a discussion on how to design contingent convertible debt requirements. 
15 Ben Bernanke (2010) said, “The release of detailed information enhanced the credibility of the exercise by giving 
outside analysts the ability to assess the findings, which helped restore investor confidence in the banking system. 
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regulators continued to disclose the results of the annual stress tests as part of the 
Comprehensive Capital Assessment and Review (CCAR) process.  
Recent economic research has questioned the benefits of these disclosures and more 
generally questioned the notion that increased transparency is always beneficial. Goldstein and 
Sapra (2013) review the recent literature considering costs and benefits of disclosure.  While 
the benefits of disclosure are well understood, possible risks include: 
• The potential for propagating runs and coordination failures 
• Reduced incentives for market participants to invest in obtaining information 
• The distortion of incentives of regulated entities to “pass the stress test” 
Itay Goldstein16 presented his research, Goldstein and Leitner (2013), which considers 
an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator who has information about banks’ ability to 
overcome future liquidity shocks. The paper considers the tradeoff between the necessity for 
disclosing information to avoid preventing a market breakdown (collapse of trade) and the 
potential that disclosing too much information destroys risk-sharing opportunities — the 
Hirshleifer (1971) effect. The authors find that no disclosure is optimal during normal times. 
However, during stress periods, partial disclosure is optimal. They relate their findings to 
disclosures of stress test results and argue that ongoing disclosure of these results in normal 
times is suboptimal.   
Til Schuermann17 also supported less disclosure of stress test results in normal times. 
Schuermann stated that the SCAP disclosures were useful given the special circumstances 
during the crisis that included government capital injections for those firms deemed to have 
insufficient capital under stress. Extensive ongoing disclosures will generate efforts by banks to 
mimic the models and results of the regulators. More aggregated exposures would provide less 
In a demonstration of greater confidence, nearly all of the SCAP firms that were judged to need additional capital 
were able to raise that capital in the public markets through new issues or by voluntary conversions of preferred to 
common shares.” 
16 Itay Goldstein is the Joel S. Ehrenkranz Family professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. He is also the Ph.D. program coordinator. Previously, he was an assistant professor of finance at 
Duke University. 
17 Til Schuermann is a partner at Oliver Wyman. Previously, he was a senior vice president at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, where he was head of Financial Intermediation in Research and head of Credit Risk in Bank 
Supervision. He also played a leadership role in the design and execution of the SCAP (bank stress test), and the 
subsequent CCAR programs.   
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
incentive to game but still allow market participants to ask hard questions when firms’ overall 
capital assessments are far different from regulatory assessments.  
 
V. Evaluating Stress Testing as a Tool to Enhance Financial Stability18  
 
Large banks that failed during the crisis often met the regulatory definition of “well 
capitalized” and rated higher than satisfactory by bank regulators in the year prior to their 
failure. Clearly, the regulatory system failed to maintain sufficient capital in the system to 
prevent the collapse of the financial system. Regulators needed to do something significantly 
different to create a more resilient financial system and to regain the public trust. Regulatory 
reform enacted new, enhanced prudential standards for those institutions deemed to be SIFIs. 
One of the cornerstones of the new standards was supervisory capital stress testing.   
These stress tests assess whether SIFIs have sufficient capital conditional on a stressed 
macroeconomic scenario. Stress tests are a major component of the Federal Reserve’s CCAR 
program. 
The Federal Reserve’s annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) is an 
intensive assessment of the capital adequacy of large, complex U.S. bank holding 
companies (BHCs) and of the practices these BHCs use to manage their capital. This 
process helps ensure that these BHCs have sufficient capital to withstand highly stressful 
operating environments and be able to continue operations, maintain ready access to 
funding, meet obligations to creditors and counterparties, and serve as credit 
intermediaries.19  
 
One significant question regarding stress testing is the appropriate measure of capital — 
whether regulations should be based on accounting data alone or market data as well. As noted 
previously, regulatory accounting measures of capital were clearly inaccurate; failing firms were 
often well capitalized using accounting measures. An alternative approach is using market-
based measures of regulatory capital.20 Advocates for this approach point to the forward-
18 The session on bank stress testing was moderated by Haluk Ünal, who is a professor of finance at the Robert H. 
Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; special advisor to the Center for Financial Research of the FDIC; 
and senior fellow at the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. 
19 “Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2014: Assessment Framework and Results,” Federal Reserve Board, 
2014. 
20 See Bulow and Klemperer (2013) and Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) for more on the role of market-based 
measure (rather than accounting-based) for capital requirements. 
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looking nature of market prices. Opponents of this approach point to potential instability 
generated by volatile measures of regulatory capital. However, it may be possible to address 
the issue of volatility by tailoring the regulatory response to market-based measures of capital. 
For example, market-based measures could be used to enforce regulations requiring 
conservation of capital (e.g., restricting dividends and stock buybacks) rather than for bank 
closure decisions.  
Stress test modeling requires dynamic projections of revenue, income/losses, balance 
sheet assets and liabilities, and regulatory capital ratios conditional on macroeconomic factors. 
The process includes projections of significant subcomponents of revenue and losses (e.g., 
residential mortgages, trading revenue) as well as projections of the total capital ratios. The 
projections include the entire quarterly path for income, losses, and capital. If banking 
organizations do not maintain sufficient capital throughout every quarter of the two-year 
window, they are subject to restrictions on dividends or other types of capital distributions and 
may be subject to other regulatory actions.    
In addition to this supervisory benchmark — an independent supervisory assessment 
based on models developed within the Federal Reserve — the CCAR process requires banking 
organizations to produce their own assessment, which estimates the required capital under 
stress conditions. Banks must not only produce estimates using the Federal Reserve stress 
scenario but also produce estimates through their own bank-designed stress scenarios that 
they have customized to their individual risks. 
The supervisory stress models are bottom-up models developed based on detailed 
industry data including loan level data for most of the loan book.21 The models are then applied 
to each bank’s individual data. As part of the process, large banks are now required to provide 
regulators with much more detailed data than had been required in the past. As a result of 
these new reporting requirements, the quality of bank data reports has been dramatically 
enhanced.  This improves a bank’s ability to understand and measure risks at the firm while 
enhancing supervisors’ ability to understand risks at the firm and risks across the banking 
industry.   
21  The Kapinos and Mitnik (2014) paper cited here shows how informative a top-down (rather than the current 
bottom-up approach) stress testing could be. 
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The bottom-up approach to stress testing is very resource intensive and time consuming 
for banking organizations and for supervisors. Kapinos and Mitnik (2014)22 examine the 
question of whether top-down stress-testing models can produce useful results. A top-down 
approach could be a useful alternative to lower the costs and time required to conduct the 
bottom-up estimates. These bottom-up models may serve as a useful benchmark to test the 
robustness of the bottom-up approach currently used by regulators. Finally, they could also be 
a useful benchmark model for smaller banks not subject to supervisory stress tests. 
Kapinos and Mitnik use Call Report data to predict income line items for banks subject 
to the DFA requirement to produce their internal stress test results (but these banks are not 
subject to the supervisory stress tests). These are generally banks with assets between $10 
billion and $50 billion. Utilizing preprovision net revenue (PPNR) and net charge-off (NCO) data, 
they build loss models and find that the top-down models performed well for the 2008 crisis 
period. They also find that allowing for bank heterogeneity is important for obtaining robust 
estimates. 
Stress tests are now a central component of banking supervision. Are supervisory stress 
tests an effective tool for enhancing resilience of the financial system? Would the financial crisis 
have been averted if they had been conducted prior to the financial crisis? These questions 
were addressed at the conference by William Lang,23 who argued that supervisory stress tests 
are an extremely effective supervisory tool if properly understood and utilized. However, by 
themselves, stress tests are limited, and it is unlikely that stress tests by themselves would have 
prevented the financial crisis.  
Lang argued that stress tests by themselves would not have accurately captured the 
mortgage-related risks because much of those risks were “repackaged” precisely to avoid 
detection by standard risk-measurement approaches. This occurred in the mortgage market 
through concentrations of risk in asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other 
structured finance products rather than on-balance-sheet loans. While the process for avoiding 
22 Pavel Kapinos, who presented his study at the conference, is a financial economist at the banking research 
section of the FDIC. 
23 William W. Lang is executive vice president and lending officer overseeing bank supervision and discount 
window lending for the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Lang is also the founder of the Federal Reserve CCAR 
Model Validation Unit.   
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risk detection will differ in the future, dynamic markets will generate risks that are structured to 
escape detection.   
Gorton (2008) explains the genesis of the mortgage crisis by stating that CDOs were too 
complex to be effectively analyzed by market participants. Lang and Jagtiani (2010) argue that 
this opacity made these instruments attractive to business managers precisely because they 
enabled managers to increase their activities without triggering risk alerts.   
Does this imply that risk modeling, including stress tests, is ineffective? Lang argued that 
risk models are a necessary and effective component of the supervisory process. However, 
quantitative analysis (including stress tests) will be most effective when used as part of a 
decision process. Statistical models are highly valuable in focusing supervisory attention on 
significant blind spots that require obtaining additional information. Lang emphasized that 
focusing on the questions raised by stress models as to emerging risks was as important as 
focusing on the final capital estimates produced by those models. 
 
VI. Did TBTF Cause the Financial Crisis and Will Regulatory Reform End TBTF?24 
 
The policy of TBTF has been a central issue for economists and policymakers for many 
years, and the term became popularized with the government’s support of large financial firms 
during the recent crisis. However, the term TBTF is not always well defined, and the role of the 
policy as a causal factor in the crisis is a subject of debate.   
George Kaufman25 discussed various definitions of TBTF and noted that alternative 
definitions have different regulatory and policy implications such as too complex to fail, too 
important to fail, too interconnected to fail, too big to liquidate, or too big to prosecute.26 
Generic TBTF represents different things to different players with different beneficiaries and 
losers and uncertainty about “who” precisely is being bailed out, by whom, why, and at what 
cost. 
24 The session on TBTF was moderated by Loretta Mester, president and chief executive officer of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
25 George G. Kaufman is the cochair of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. He is also the John Smith 
Professor of finance and economics at Loyola University Chicago. 
26 For more details of his discussion, see Kaufman (2014). 
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Kaufman noted that while much of the public discussion of TBTF has focused on 
providing protection to taxpayers, the real issue goes beyond the source of funds used for a 
bailout. The possibility of a creditor bailout creates a moral hazard problem, no matter where 
the bailout funds originate. Ron Feldman, who also presented at the conference, added that 
the empirical evidence was mixed regarding moral hazard. 
Richard Herring27 pointed out that a fundamental issue around TBTF in the U.S. is the 
ambiguity concerning when the government will engage in TBTF policies. Herring stated that in 
many countries there is no ambiguity about the willingness of governments to rescue large 
banking organizations. In contrast, U.S. policymakers have articulated a policy of constructive 
ambiguity to create doubt about government protections and thus mitigate moral hazard. 
However, this policy may contribute to market uncertainty and instability. During the financial 
crisis, some firms such as AIG and Bear Stearns received government support, while some 
comparable firms such as Lehman Brothers did not. Herring argued that such uncertainty 
contributed to the chaotic market conditions following the Lehman failure.   
For many years, economists have pointed to the potential for moral hazard and 
excessive risk taking resulting from TBTF policies, and there is general agreement that TBTF 
represents a government subsidy for financial firms.28 However, empirical analyses differ as to 
the size of the subsidy. Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) estimate a significant subsidy for those banks 
that became TBTF through mergers and acquisitions. Deniz Anginer29 presented his research — 
Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2014) — which examines the relationship between credit 
spreads and risk taking. The results indicate that TBTF institutions have lower spreads than 
other institutions and that TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk. In 
contrast, Randall Kroszner (2014)30 cast doubt in his presentation about the reliability of 
27 Richard J. Herring is the Jacob Safra Professor of international banking and professor of finance at the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, where he is also founding director of the Wharton Financial Institutions 
Center. 
28 See, for example, Stern and Feldman (2009 and 2004). 
29 Deniz Anginer is a financial economist at the World Bank. Previously, he worked as a consultant for Oliver 
Wyman.   
30 Randall S. Kroszner is the Norman R. Bobins professor of economics at the University of Chicago’s Booth School 
of Business. He also served as a Governor of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 2006 to 2009. 
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findings in the literature on TBTF and credit risk spreads. He shows that large nonbanking firms 
seem to experience similar funding advantages obtained at large TBTF banks.  
In his presentation, Ron Feldman31 pointed out that the evidence for moral hazard as a 
cause of the crisis was weak. He noted that even studies of credit spreads that found a TBTF 
subsidy generally found that spread differentials were small prior to the financial crisis. If moral 
hazard was the precipitating cause of the crisis, then we would expect to see a funding 
advantage to SIFIs prior to those firms becoming distressed.   
In addition, the government’s implicit subsidy had been viewed primarily as a subsidy to 
large banking organizations. It is unlikely that market participants believed that investment 
banks such as Bear Stearns and insurers such as AIG were covered by an implicit guarantee. Yet, 
many of these financial institutions were at the heart of the crisis. This echoes Franklin Allen’s 
concerns discussed previously that ending TBTF will not prevent systemic crises by itself.   
Feldman argued that while TBTF subsidies may not have been the cause of the crisis, 
nevertheless the fundamental goals of the DFA with respect to SIFIs remained valid. These goals 
include stronger capital and liquidity requirements based on the degree of systemic importance 
of the institution, strong supervisory programs including stress testing, and resolving distressed 
SIFIs while maintaining financial stability. 
Arthur Murton32 described the DFA resolution plan process and expressed his view that 
the plan would be effective in eliminating TBTF problems. Title 1 of the DFA requires that large 
banking organizations and nonbank SIFIs to submit resolution plans, or “living wills,” that show 
how they would be resolved under the U.S. bankruptcy code. SIFIs are typically very complex, 
with hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of interconnected entities. Unwinding these very 
complex companies is a major challenge for the normal bankruptcy process. Fleming and Sarkar 
(2014) detail the lengthy bankruptcy process to resolve Lehman Brothers. They show that the 
complexity of the company slowed down resolution and magnified losses. The goal of living 
31 Ron Feldman is executive vice president and senior policy adviser at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
He is the senior officer in charge of Supervision, Regulation & Credit. Feldman has coauthored with Gary Stern 
(previous president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) a book Too Big to Fail: 
The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, published by the Brookings Institution Press (2004). 
32 Art Murton is the director of the FDIC’s Office of Complex Financial Institutions and oversees contingency 
planning for resolving and the resolution of systemically important financial companies.    
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wills is to reduce the organizational complexity of SIFIs and to allow speedy resolution through 
bankruptcy. However, many are skeptical that the bankruptcy process can act swiftly enough to 
prevent fire sales of assets and liquidity disruptions due to unresolved claims.   
To address concerns that the bankruptcy process may be an ineffective process to 
resolve SIFIs, the DFA created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) under Title II, which 
provides the FDIC backup authority to place a SIFI into receivership if resolution through 
bankruptcy would have serious adverse effects on U.S. financial stability. Using a Single Point of 
Entry (SPOE) strategy under Title II, the FDIC would place the failed/failing top-tier parent 
company into receivership and keep subsidiaries operating to avoid any market interruption.33 
To be effective, Title II requires that the top-tier holding company maintains a sufficient amount 
of equity and unsecured debt for the recapitalization, without either threatening short-term 
funding liabilities or necessitating injections of capital from the government.34   
Will the new resolution regime be effective in protecting financial stability and in ending 
TBTF?  This was a subject of considerable debate at the conference. Sandra Lawson35 believes 
that the TBTF problem has ended and that the discussion around resolution plans should not 
focus on the most difficult issue (cross border resolution) but rather on SIFI’s ability to absorb 
losses. Her study shows that loss absorbency among U.S. G-SIFIs has risen sharply since the 
33 The following is a quick summary of the FDIC resolution process: 1) Receivership — Transfer assets to newly 
created bridge financial company, replace officers, appoint new board of directors. 2) Funding — Well-capitalized 
bridge company — with funding from private market — if market funding not immediately obtained, the FDIC 
could utilize Orderly Liquidity Fund (OLF), which is a LOC that the FDIC has from the Treasury, on a short-term 
transitional basis. Taxpayer losses are prohibited. 3) Claims — SHS’s equity, sub debt, and substantial portion of 
unsecured debt of HC are left in receivership — loss in this order. 4) Termination of Bridge Co. — terminated upon 
FDIC approval of enforceable restructuring plan — will then be owned by outside creditors. 5) International 
coordination plays an important role in the resolution process — the FDIC has been working closely with the U.K. 
regulators and the European Union. 
34 The SPOE strategy is intended to minimize market disruption by isolating the failure and associated losses in a 
SIFI to the top-tier holding company while maintaining operations at the subsidiary level so that the resolution 
would be confined to one legal entity (the holding company) and would not trigger the need for resolution or 
bankruptcy across the operating subsidiaries, multiple business lines, or various sovereign jurisdictions. The FDIC is 
still in the process of determining the required (optimal) amount of debt holding to ensure sufficient funding for 
the operations of the critical functions and a successful recapitalization.   
35 Sandra Lawson is a managing director at Goldman Sachs and the director of the Global Markets Institute, the 
firm’s public policy research center. 
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crisis — bank capital (first line of defense) has improved in both quantity and quality (under the 
Basel II and Basel III).36   
George Kaufman argued that TBTF has not ended because there is still an agency 
problem (moral hazard) at large financial institutions. The DFA Living Will under Title I and the 
OLA resolution regime under Title II are steps in the right direction, but they have not 
eliminated the agency problem. The public needs to be convinced that large financial firms will 
not get bailouts for the moral hazard problems to be eliminated. However, given the past 
history of government rescues, it is likely that there will be considerable market skepticism until 
the regime has actually been implemented. Moreover, even if a single SIFI were to be 
successfully resolved, it would still need to be tested in a situation where there was distress at a 
number of SIFIs. Thus, establishing credibility is unlikely to occur without another major 
financial disruption.    
The DFA established stronger regulatory requirements for SIFIs to combat systemic risk. 
These stronger regulatory requirements might be expected to create incentives for banks to 
downsize. However, Richard Herring presented empirical evidence that U.S. banking markets 
have become increasingly concentrated after the financial crisis, with the largest banking 
organizations gaining market share. It remains to be seen if SIFIs eventually shrink in response 
to tighter regulatory requirements over the longer run, but to date, the trend has been for large 
organizations to get larger.   
 
VII. Reforming the Housing Finance System37 
 
The coverage of the conference would be incomplete without discussion on mortgage 
and housing finance issues since the U.S. mortgage crisis was the epicenter of the global 
financial crisis. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen discussed the relationship between the 
mortgage crisis and financial crisis in a speech on July 2, 2014: 
36 Lawson (2014) finds that the chance of well-capitalized banks’ tier 1 capital falling below 4 percent was once in 
41 years during the precrisis period but now once every 56 years.   
37 The mortgages and housing finance reform session was moderated by David Musto, who is the Ronald O. 
Perelman professor in finance, and chairperson of the finance department, at the Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania. 
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Although it was not recognized at the time, risks to financial stability within the U.S. 
escalated to a dangerous level in the mid-2000s. During that period, policymakers — 
myself included — were aware that homes seemed overvalued by a number of sensible 
metrics and that home prices might decline, although there was disagreement about 
how likely such a decline was and how large it might be. What was not appreciated was 
how serious the fallout from such a decline would be for the financial sector and the 
macroeconomy. Policymakers failed to anticipate that the reversal of the house price 
bubble would trigger the most significant financial crisis in the United States since the 
Great Depression because that reversal interacted with critical vulnerabilities in the 
financial system and in government regulation. 
 
James Barth38 provided a general perspective on the U.S. housing and mortgage market. 
His analysis indicated that the U.S. market is unique in a number of respects. In particular, U.S. 
consumers spend approximately 31 percent of their income on housing expenditures, a larger 
share than most other countries. U.S. houses have become significantly larger as U.S. 
households have grown smaller. Barth pointed to the substantial government subsidization of 
home purchases, through tax benefits and subsidization of the government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), as the principal cause of these trends. Despite that, he noted most of the 
effects of the subsidy can be seen in the size of homes with relatively modest increases in the 
homeownership rate. He also noted that the growth in private label securitization had only a 
transitory impact on the homeownership rate. Barth argued that the U.S. government should 
reduce or eliminate subsidization of homeownership.     
Ronel Elul39 presented his research on mortgage securitization, which examines opacity 
in mortgage securitization. Elul (2014) finds evidence of adverse selection in mortgage 
securitizations with poorer performance of securitized mortgages relative to securitized 
mortgages and that information on the quality of mortgages is opaque to investors. His results 
suggest that increased transparency would improve market efficiency.    
38 James R. Barth is the Lowder eminent scholar in finance at Auburn University, a senior rellow at the Milken 
Institute, and a fellow at the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. 
39 Ronel Elul is a senior economic advisor and economist in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia. He is also an adjunct associate professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
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Susan Wachter40 presented her research, which examines the connection between 
transparency in the mortgage market and price volatility in the housing market, focusing on 
transparency related to geographic risk. Pavlov, Wachter, and Zevelev (2014) find that 
increasing transparency in the financial market is associated with increasing local house price 
volatility and increasing losses to MBS investors. Their paper finds that more transparency, in 
their case transparency about geographic risk, tends to reduce demand for the securities and 
increase volatility in the housing market.   
The GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, played an important role in the 
mortgage crisis, which led to the financial crisis. The GSEs purchased mortgages from banks and 
other mortgage lenders, packaged them into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and provided 
guarantees of principal and interest payments on these MBSs. Market participants believed 
that the GSEs had the implicit backing of the federal government, and thus, GSE guarantees and 
debt obligations were treated as obligations guaranteed by the U.S. government. The 2008 
crisis proved that the “implied” taxpayer backing of the GSEs was real, with the government 
eventually placing Freddie and Fannie into conservatorship on September 6, 2008.    
Although mortgages were at the center of the financial crisis, reform of the housing 
finance system was not a part of the DFA. Joseph Tracy41 discussed his proposal for reform 
developed with other staff members at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. One goal of the 
proposal is to replace implicit government guarantees with explicit government guarantees 
covering tail risks in the housing market. Tracy argued that governments have demonstrated 
their desire to absorb tail risk and that greater ex ante transparency is preferable to implicit 
subsidies. The proposal would establish one or more lender cooperatives to replace the GSEs. 
The proposal would maintain the benefits of economies of scale and scope of the current 
system by creating a small number of securitizers for standardized mortgage products. 
However, the proposal would require higher capital levels and stress testing to address 
problems of regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, it includes a vintage-based reinsurance approach 
40 Susan M. Wachter is the Richard B. Worley professor of financial management, a professor of real estate and 
finance at the Wharton School, and codirector of the Penn Institute for Urban Research. 
41 Joseph Tracy is an executive vice president and special advisor to the president at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. Previously, he was director of Research.   
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to better align public and private incentives. The pricing structure is designed so that the 
government owns the tail risk but only the tail risk. 
Despite the demonstrated weaknesses in our housing finance system, there has been no 
fundamental reform in response to the mortgage crisis. This is in part due to the economic 
complexity of the issue but also due to political complexities of reform. The conference 
discussion indicated some important key principals that should guide reform, including the 
transparency of the government’s role, the elimination of implicit subsidies, and improved risk-
based pricing to better align public and private incentives. This issue will be a major public 
policy question in the U.S. as Congress considers alternative reform proposals.     
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The financial crisis has generated fundamental reforms in the financial regulatory 
system in the U.S. and internationally. Much of this reform was in direct response to the 
weaknesses revealed in the precrisis system. However, future crises are likely to be different 
than prior crises, and market risks will arise in response to the incentives created by the new 
regulatory architecture.   
This paper addresses fundamental questions related to financial reform and maintaining 
financial stability. These questions discussed previously will be important subjects for economic 
analysis as well as public policy debate over the coming years. Regulatory reform is still in its 
early stages and is incomplete in some important areas. There will be intense academic and 
public interest in determining the impact of the reform efforts and whether they are achieving 
the goal of enhancing financial stability. The papers in this volume represent an important 
contribution to that ongoing analysis.   
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